Propositional Logic of Essence by Correia, Fabrice
FABRICE CORREIA
PROPOSITIONAL LOGIC OF ESSENCE
ABSTRACT. This paper presents a propositional version of Kit Fine’s (quantified) logic
for essentialist statements, provides it with a semantics, and proves the former adequate
(i.e. sound and complete) with respect to the latter.
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INTRODUCTION
The present paper can be considered as a companion to Kit Fine’s papers
‘The Logic of Essence’ and ‘Semantics for the Logic of Essence’.1 In
the first paper Fine presents a logical system for quantified essentialist
statements, E5.2 In the second he presents a semantics for a variant of the
system, and proves this system adequate (i.e. sound and complete) with
respect to that semantics. I propose here a Kripke-style semantics for E5pi ,
a propositional counterpart of E5, and prove the adequacy of the latter with
respect to the former.
There are many, more or less natural, more or less interesting, ways
to extend E5pi (or one of its cousins) to a system of quantified logic of
essence. E5pi , together with its semantics, is intended to constitute the core
of subsequent, more expressive, logics of essence. So, the study of E5pi per
se, regardless of possible quantificational extensions, is of great interest.
Another interesting point about the present study lies in the fact that the
completeness proof given here is much simpler than the one Fine gives for
his quantificational system.
The reader is strongly urged to take a look at Fine’s papers on the logic
of essence, if only because no detailed comparison between Fine’s material
and mine will be offred.
I. THE LANGUAGE
In E5pi , the basic essentialist statements have the form XA,A being a
formula andX a delimiter. Delimiters are intended to be names for classes,
1Published in Journal of Philosophical Logic 29, issue 3, 295-313, 2000
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and formulas of typeXA are to be read as ‘it is true in virtue of the nature
of some elements of X that A’. The language, L, in which we formulate
E5pi , has the following vocabulary:
(i) a denumerable stock of basic delimiters, containing the universal
delimiter V ;
(ii) the union operator +;
(iii) the dependence closure operator c;
(iv) the constituency operator | |;
(v) the identity operator ≈;
(vi) a denumerable stock of sentence letters;
(vii) the truth-functional connectives ∼ and &;
(viii) the essentialist operator ;
(ix) the bracketing devices ( and ).
The delimiters and formulas of L are defined by the following simultane-
ous induction (X,Y , etc. will always be used for arbitrary delimiters and
A,B, etc. for arbitrary formulas):
(i) every basic delimiter is a delimiter;
(ii) if X and Y are delimiters, so is (X + Y );
(iii) if X is a delimiter, so is cX;
(iv) if A is a formula, |A| is a delimiter;
(v) if X and Y are delimiters, (X≈Y ) is a formula;
(vi) sentence letters are formulas;
(vii) if A and B are formulas, so are (∼A) and (A&B);
(viii) if X is a delimiter and A a formula, (XA) is a formula.
Material implication (⊃) is defined in the standard way, and we use:
♦XA for ∼X∼A, and
X < Y for X + Y ≈ Y.
Finally, a d-atom is a formula of type X ≈ Y , for X and Y delimiters, and
a d-formula is a truth-functional compound of d-atoms.
The intended meanings of symbols V,+, c| | and ≈ remain to be ex-
plained:
• Symbol V , the universal delimiter, is intended to denote the class of all
possible objects.
• Symbol + is intented to express class union. So, if X and Y are de-
limiters, then under the present interpretation X + Y denotes the class
consisting of all members of X and Y (and only them).
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• The identity operator ≈ is intended to express a form of class identity
– call it identity∗. Where C and D are classes, ‘C is identical∗ to D’
means ‘each member of C is identical to some member of D, and each
member of D is identical to some member of C’. (Accordingly, symbol
< is intended to express class inclusion∗ , where ‘C is included∗ in D’
means ‘each member of C is identical to some member of D’.) So,
for instance, ‘{a} is identical∗ to {b}’ means ‘a is identical to b’ – and
not ‘{a} is identical to {b}’. Of course, for any classes C and D, C
is identical∗ to D iff C is identical to D. But the difference between
identity∗ and identity is dramatic in the present context. Indeed, it is a
theorem of E5pi that XX ≈ X. But while it is plausible that it is true
in virtue of the nature of Socrates that Socrates = Socrates (i.e. that
{Socrates} be identical∗ to {Socrates}), we may not want to say that it is
true in virtue of the nature of Socrates that {Socrates} = {Socrates}.3
• The notion of the constituents of a proposition, of the objects involved in
that proposition, is central to E5pi . For each formula A the delimiter |A|
is intended to refer to the class of all the constituents of the proposition
expressed by A.
• The notion of ontological dependence is also entral to E5pi .4 One of
Fine’s crucial claims about essence is this: if P is true in virtue of
the nature of an object x, then x depends on each constituent of the
proposition expressed by P . This thesis generalizes to the following,
more suited to the form of the essentialist claims in E5pi : if P is true
in virtue of the nature of some elements of class C, then for every
constituent y of the proposition expressed by P there is some element
x of C such that x depends on y – in bastard notation: CP ⊃ [∀y ∈
|P | ∃x ∈ C dep(x, y)]. Since there is no quantification in E5pi , we
must find a different means of expressing the claim. This is the role
of the dependence closure operator c. Ontological dependence, as here
construed, is a reflexive transitive relation. Let S be a non-empty set,
P (S) its power set, and dep a binary reflexive transitive relation de-
fined on S. Let dep∗ be the function from P (S) onto itself defined by
dep∗(s) =df {y ∈ S : ∃x x ∈ s & dep(x, y)} for every s ∈ P (S). It is
easy to check that for every s and t in P (S):
(i) if s ⊂ t , then dep∗(s) ⊂ dep∗(t),
(ii) s ⊂ dep∗(s),
(iii) dep∗(dep∗(s)) = dep∗(s), and
(iv) dep∗(s ∪ t) = dep∗(s) ∪ dep∗(t).
Conditions (i)–(iii) state that dep∗ is a closure operator on P (S), and
condition (iv) states that dep∗ is an endomorphism of 〈P (S),∪〉. The de-
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pendence closure c is meant to refer to a function on classes similar to dep∗ 
above, i.e. satisfying (i)–(iv).
II. THE SYSTEM
The axioms and rules of system E5pi are grouped under the following five
headings. The axioms (2)–(3) are motivated by the above discussion, those
of (4) are indeed theorems of E5, the rule (5) (iv) is a rule of E5, and finally
the axioms in (5) are roughly Fine’s, but adapted to our new language.
(1) Classical
Every L-instance of a tautology counts as an axiom, and Modus Ponens
as a rule, of E5pi .
(2) Delimiters
(i) X ≈ X
(ii) X ≈ X ⊃ Y ≈ X
(iii) (X ≈ Y &Y ≈ Z) ⊃ X ≈ Z
(iv) X ≈ Y ⊃ X + Z ≈ Y + Z
(v) X +X ≈ X
(vi) X + Y ≈ Y +X
(vii) X + (Y + Z) ≈ (X + Y )+ Z
(viii) X < V
(3) Closure
(i) X < Y ⊃ cX < cY
(ii) X < cX
(iii) ccX ≈ cX
(iv) c(X + Y ) ≈ cX + cY
(4) Constituency
(i) |X ≈ Y | ≈ X + Y
(ii) |∼A| ≈ |A|
(iii) |A&B| ≈ |A| + |B|
(iv) |XA| ≈ X + |A|
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(5) Essence
(i) XA ⊃ A T -axiom
(ii) X(A ⊃ B) ⊃ (XA ⊃ XB) K-axiom
(iii) ♦XA ⊃ X+|A|♦XA E-axiom
(iv) A\|A|A Necessitation
(v) X < Y ⊃ (XA ⊃ YA) Subsumption
(vi) X ≈ Y ⊃ X+YX ≈ Y Rigidity
(vii) cXA ⊃ XA Chaining
(viii) XA ⊃ |A| < cX Localization
The part of E5pi determined by (1)–(4) only constitutes what I shall call
the ‘logic of delimiters’. The theorems of the logic of delimiters have little
intrinsic interest, and those which will be used below are easy to prove.
They will be exploited without demonstration.
Some of the following propositions will be useful in later parts of this
paper:
PROPOSITION II.1.
(i) If `A then `|A| < cX ⊃ XA.
(ii) If `A ⊃ B then `|A| + |B| < cX ⊃ (XA ⊃ XB).
(iii) If `A ⊃ B then `|A| + |B| < cX ⊃ (♦XA ⊃ ♦XB).
(iv) `(XA&XB) ⊃ X(A&B)
(v) `XA ⊃ XXA
(vi) For every d-formula A, `A ⊃ |A|A.
Proof. (i) Suppose `A. By Necessitation, it follows that `|A|A. By
Subsumption, `|A| < cX ⊃ (|A|A ⊃ cXA). So, `|A| < cX ⊃ cXA.
Finally, Chaining gives the result.
(ii) Assume `A ⊃ B. By (i), `|A ⊃ B| < cX ⊃ X(A ⊃ B). Then
by the K-axiom, `|A ⊃ B| < cX ⊃ (XA ⊃ XB). The result follows
by the logic of delimiters.
(iii) Essentially from (ii).
(iv) `A ⊃ (B ⊃ A&B) by truth-functional logic. By (ii) and the logic
of delimiters, it follows that `|A| + |B| < cX ⊃ (XA ⊃ X(B ⊃
A&B)). Then by the K-axiom `|A| + |B| < cX&XA&XB ⊃
X(A&B). But by Localization and the logic of delimiters, `XA&
XB ⊃ |A| + |B| < cX. The result follows.
(v) By the T -axiom, `XA ⊃ ♦X+|A|XA. By the E-axiom (and the
logic of delimiters and Subsumption), `♦X+|A|XA ⊃ X+|A|♦X+|A|XA.
By the E-axiom again, `♦X+|A|XA ⊃ XA. These three theorems entail
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that `XA ⊃ X+|A|XA. Now by Localization and the logic of delim-
iters, `XA ⊃ X + |A| < cX. We thus have `XA ⊃ (X + |A| <
cX&X+|A|XA). By Subsumption, it follows that `XA ⊃ cXXA.
The result then follows by Chaining.
(vi) By induction on the length of the formulas.
(a) If A is a d-atom, we have `A ⊃ |A|A by Rigidity and the logic of
delimiters.
(b) Suppose A is ∼B. By IH,`B ⊃ |B|B. By (iii) and the logic
of delimiters, it follows that `♦|B|B ⊃ ♦|B||B|B. By the E-axiom and
the T -axiom, we have then `♦|B|B ⊃ B. Consequently, by the logic of
delimiters and Subsumption, `∼B ⊃ |∼B|∼B.
(c) Suppose A is B&C. By IH,`B ⊃ |B|B and `C ⊃ |C|C.
By Subsumption and the logic of delimiters, then, `B ⊃ |B&C|B and
`C ⊃ |B&C|C. Thus `B&C ⊃ |B&C|B&|B&C|c. By (iv) it follows
that `B&C ⊃ |B&C|(B&C).
III. THE SEMANTICS
Before defining the models for E5pi , some notions have to be introduced.
• [Semilattice] A semilattice is a couple 〈S,t〉, where S is a non-empty
set and t a binary operation on S, such that for every x, y and z in S:
(i) x t x = x,
(ii) x t y = y t x, and
(iii) x t (y t z) = (x t y) t z.
Given a semilattice 〈S,t〉, we define the partial order < on S by x < y iff
x t y = y.
An object 1 is said to be a greatest element of a semilattice 〈S,t〉 iff
1 ∈ S and for every x ∈ S, x t 1 = 1 (i.e. x < 1). A semilattice has at
most one greatest element.
• [Dependence structure] A closure operator on a semilattice 〈S,t〉 is a
function γ from S onto S such that for every x and y in S:
(i) if x < y, then γ (x) < γ (y),
(ii) x < γ (x), and
(iii) γ (γ (x)) = γ (x).
An element x of a semilattice 〈S,t〉 is said to be closed (with respect to
the closure operator γ defined on 〈S,t〉) iff there is some y in S such that
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x = γ (y), i.e. iff γ (x) = x. It should be noticed that if 〈S,t〉 has a greatest
element 1, then 1 is closed for any closure operator defined on 〈S,t〉.
A closure operator γ defined on a semilattice 〈S,t〉 is said to be a
dependence closure operator iff γ is an endomorphism of 〈S,t〉, i.e. iff
for every x and y in S, γ (x t y) = γ (x) t γ (y).
A dependence structure is any quadruple 〈S, 1,t, γ 〉, where 〈S,t〉 is a
semilattice with greatest element 1 and γ is a dependence closure operator
on 〈S,t〉.
• [Constituency model] Where1 = 〈S, 1,t, γ 〉 is a dependence structure,
we define a constituency function for L on1 as a function i which assigns
to each nonlogical primitive expression of L (basic delimiter or sentence
letter) a member of S, such that i(V ) = 1. A constituency model for
language L is a pair 〈1, i〉, where 1 is a dependence structure and i is
a constituency function for L on 1.
Given any constituency model 〈1, i〉, with 1 = 〈S, 1,t, γ 〉, func-
tion i is extended to every delimiter and every formula by the following
conditions:5
(1) (X ≈ Y )i = Xi t Y i ,
(2) (∼A)i = Ai,
(3) (A&B)i = Ai t Bi,
(4) (XA)i = Xi t Ai,
(5) (X + Y )i = Xi t Y i,
(6) (cX)i = γ (Xi), and
(7) |Ai | = Ai .
The notion of satisfaction of a d-formula by a constituency model 〈1, i〉
is defined recursively in the obvious way:
(i) a d-atom X ≈ Y is satisfied by 〈1, i〉 iff Xi = Y i
(ii) ∼A is satisfied by 〈1, i〉 iff A is not satisfied by 〈1, i〉
(iii) A&B is satisfied by 〈1, i〉 iffA and B are both satisfied by 〈1, i〉.
• [E5pi -model] An E5pi -model for L is a 6-tuple 〈W,@,1, dom, i, [·]〉,
where:
(i) W (worlds) is a set,
(ii) @ (the actual world) is in W ,
(iii) 1 = 〈S, 1,t, γ 〉 is a dependence structure,
(iv) dom is a surjective function from W onto γ (S) such that dom(@)
= 1 (γ (S) is the set of all closed elements of S),
(v) i is a constituency function for L on 1, and
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(vi) [·] is a function (a ‘truth-set function’) taking each sentence letter
A of L into some subsetW ′ ofW , with the condition that for every
w in W ′, Ai < dom(w).
For every element x of S, we shall say that w ∈ W is an x-world iff
x < dom(w), and we define Wx as the set of all x-worlds. Since for every
x ∈ S, x < 1 = dom(@), each Wx contains @ and thus is not empty.
The condition expressed in (vi) can then be rephrased as requiring that for
every sentence letter A, [A] be a part of WAi . The proof of the following
proposition is straightforward:
PROPOSITION III.1. For every elements x and y of S:
(i) x < γ (y) iff Wy ⊂ Wx.
(ii) γ (x) = γ (y) iff Wx = Wy.
(iii) Wxty = Wx ∩Wy.
(iv) Wγ(x) = Wx.
(v) @ ∈ W1 ⊂ Wx.
• [Truth] For every E5pi -model 〈W,@,1, dom, i, [·]〉, function [·] is ex-
tended to the set of all formulas by the following conditions:
(1) [X ≈ Y ] = (i) WAi if Xi = Y i ,
(ii) ∅ otherwise.
(2) [∼A] = WAi − [A].
(3) [A&B] = [A] ∩ [B].
(4) [XA] = (i) WXi if WXi ⊂ [A],
(ii) ∅ otherwise.
Note that for every d-formula A, [A] = WAi iff A is satisfied by con-
stituency model 〈1, i〉.
One can easily verify that for every formula A:
(i) [A] ⊂ WAi ,
(ii) [A] ∪ [∼A] = WAi , and
(iii) [A] ∩ [∼A] = ∅.
Let us define truth-at-a-world and falsity-at-a-world by the following nat-
ural conditions:
A is true at w iff w ∈ [A], and
A is false at w iff w ∈ [∼A].
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(ii) above implies that formula A has a truth value at world w iff w is an
Ai-world, that is, iff the constituents of the proposition expressed by A
belong to the domain of w. Notice that consequently, every formula has a
truth value at the actual world.
Here are some consequences of the conditions on [·] in terms of truth
values:
(1) A sentence letter A has a truth value at world w iff w is an Ai-world.
(2) Let A be d-atom X ≈ Y .
(i) A has a truth value at w iff w is an Ai-world (i.e. iff w is both an
Xi-world and a Y i-world).
(ii) A is true at w iff A has a truth value at w and Xi = Y i .
(iii) A is false at w iff A has a truth value at w and Xi 6= Y i .
(3) (i) ∼A has a truth value at w iff w is a (∼A)i-world (i.e. iff w is an
Ai-world).
(ii) ∼A is true at w iff A is false at w.
(iii) ∼A is false at w iff A is true at w.
(4) (i) A&B has a truth value at w iff w is an (A&B)i-world (i.e. iff w is
both an Ai-world and a Bi-world).
(ii) A&B is true at w iff both A and B are true at w.
(iii) A&B is false at w iff both A and B have a truth value at w and at
least one of them is false at w.
(5) (i) XA has a truth value at w iff w is a (XA)i-world (i.e. iff w is
both an Xi-world and an Ai-world).
(ii) XA is true at w iff Xi < dom(w) and for every w′ such that
Xi < dom(w′),A is true at w′.
(iii) XA is false at w iff Xi t Ai < dom(w) and for some w′ such
that Xi < dom(w′), either it is not the case that Ai < dom(w′) or A
is false at w′.
The conditions at the actual world are more standard:
(1) every sentence letter has a truth value.
(2) d-atom X ≈ Y is true iff Xi = Y i (and false iff Xi 6= Y i).
(3) ∼A is true iff A is false (and ∼A is false iff A is true).
(4) A&B is true iff both A and B are true (and A&B is false iff A or B is
false).
(5) XA is true iff A is true at everyXi-world (andXA is false iff either
A lacks a truth value at someXi-world orA is false at someXi-world).
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Notice the analogy with the modal (S5) truth-conditions for the necessity
operator . The analogy amounts to identity in the case of the universal
essentialist operator V .
• [Validity] A formulaA is said to be valid on E5pi -model 〈W,@,1, dom,
i, [·]〉 iff [A] = WAi . That is, A is valid on a model iff it is true at every
world of that model where it has a truth value. A formula A is said to
be valid iff A is valid on every E5pi -model. We already saw that given
any model 〈W,@,1, dom, i, [·]〉, with 1 = 〈S, 1,t, γ, i〉, for every d-
formulaA, [A] = WAi iffA is satisfied by constituency model 〈S, 1,t, γ 〉.
Consequently, a d-formula is valid on an E5pi -model iff it is satisfied by
the corresponding constituency model, and it is valid iff it is satisfied by
every constituency model.
Before turning to the adequacy theorems, let me briefly explain the in-
tended interpretation of the semantics. Let D be the class of all possible
objects, that is, the class of everything that can be referred to or quantified
over. Under a standard version of possible world semantics for quantified
modal languages, each world w is assigned a subclass Dw of D, its ‘do-
main’, which is the class of all objects existing inw, and even if the domain
of a world w is strictly included in D, every member of D can be referred
to ‘from’ w (e.g. for object a not in Dw, ‘a = a’ is still true at w). Now,
in the semantics presented above, the domains are not to be thought of in
the same way. The domain of world w is intended to be the class of all
possible objects of w, that is, of all the objects than can be referred to or
quantified over from w.
The requirement that the domains be closed (under the dependence
relation) may be argued for as follows. Assume that object x belongs to
the domain of world w, and that consequently x can be referred to from
w. Suppose, moreover, that x depends on y, i.e. that x’s essence contains
y as a constituent, or equivalently, that y belongs to some proposition that
is true in virtue of x’s nature. Then such a proposition is true at w, and
thus y belongs to the domain of w. Conversely, arguably the only reason
why a part C of D could not be a domain is that C contains an object x
whose nature contains an object y not in C – i.e. that C is not closed under
dependency. Hence the surjectivity requirement for function dom.
Under the intended interpretation of our semantics, the actual world is
assigned the biggest possible domain, namely D, the class of all possible
objects.
Let us turn now to the truth conditions. As we saw, our semantic rules
have the consequence that a sentence may be neither true nor false at some
world w. Indeed, A has a truth value at w iff w is an Ai-world, that is, iff
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the constituents of the proposition expressed by A belong to the domain
of w. This point is in accordance with the previous discussion, provided
that a certain claim is accepted. The claim is that one can only refer to
(or quantify over) possible entities. I shall not discuss this, but, if it is
accepted, then on the view that a sentence containing denotationless terms
has no truth value, the semantical point under discussion is surely correct.
The truth conditions for negation, conjunction and essence all seem
quite natural. And similarly for the truth conditions for d-formulas. The
only substantial point about them is this: at a given world w, a d-formula
A is either deprived of a truth value (this is the case where some constituent
of the proposition expressed by A is not inw), or essentially true, or essen-
tially false – to be more precise: true/false in virtue of the constituents of
the proposition it expresses. But, I think, the point is harmless, for under
the intended interpretation of L, d-formulas basically express identities.
IV. SOUNDNESS
PROPOSITION IV.1. E5pi is sound (with respect to the class of E5pi -
models).
Proof. The proof does not present any special difficulty. However, I
shall go through it in some details.
(1) As we saw, a d-formula is valid on an E5pi -model iff it is sat-
isfied by the underlying constituency model. And obviously, the axioms
for delimiters, closure and constituency are satisfied by every constituency
model.
(2) It is also clear that every PC-tautology is valid on every E5pi -model.
Modus Ponens is validity-preserving, as the following argument shows.
Let A and B be two formulas, with A and A ⊃ B valid. Let M =
〈W,@,1, dom, i, [·]〉 be an arbitrary E5pi -model, with w in W a Bi-
world. Now we must prove that B is true at w in M. Let N = 〈W,@,1,
dom, k, {·}〉 be the E5pi -model defined by the following conditions (X is
any basic delimiter, and C is any sentence letter):
Xk = (i) dom(w) if X is in A but not in B,
(ii) Xi otherwise.
Ck = (i) dom(w) if C is in A but not in B,
(ii) Xi otherwise.
{C} = (i) Wdom(w) if C is in A but not in B,
(ii) [C] otherwise.
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By construction, w is both an Ak-world and an (A ⊃ B)k-world. So, since
A and A ⊃ B are valid, A and A ⊃ B are both true at w in N , and
consequently, B is true at w in N as well. But now, one can prove that B
is true at w in N iff B is true at w in M. So, B is true at w in M.
For the remaining axioms and rule, let 〈W,@,1, dom, i, [·]〉 be an
arbitrary E5pi -model, with 1 = 〈S, 1,t, γ 〉.
(3) T-axiom. Let w be in WXi ∩ WAi , and suppose that w ∈ [XA].
Then [XA] 6= ∅, which implies that WXi ⊂ [A]. But then since w ∈
WXi , w ∈ [A].
(4) K-axiom. Let w be in WXi ∩ WAi ∩ WBi , and suppose that w ∈
[X(A ⊃ B)] and w ∈ [XA]. This implies: WXi ⊂ [A ⊃ B] and WXi ⊂
[A]. Now, [A ⊃ B] = WAi ∩WBi ∩ (−[A] ∪ [B]). But since WXi ⊂ [A], it
is not the case thatWXi ⊂ −[A], and thus sinceWXi ⊂ [A ⊃ B], we have:
WXi ⊂ [B]. Therefore, [xB] = WXi . Now since w ∈ WXi , w ∈ [XB].
(5) E-axiom. Let w be in WXi ∩WAi , and suppose that w ∈ [∼XA].
By definition:
(i) [X+|A|∼XA] = WXi ∩ WAi if WXi ∩ WAi ⊂ [∼XA], and
[X+|A|∼XA] = ∅ otherwise, and
(ii) [∼XA] = ∅ ifWXi ⊂ [A], and [∼XA] = WXi ∩WAi otherwise.
Now, since w ∈ [∼XA], [∼XA] 6= ∅, and thus by (ii) [∼XA] =
WXi ∩WAi . By (i) it follows that [X+|A|∼XA] = WXi ∩WAi . But since
w ∈ WXi ∩WAi , we have w ∈ [X+|A|∼XA].
(6) Necessitation. Suppose that A is valid in M, i.e. that [A] = WAi .
By definition: [|A|A] = WAi if WAi ⊂ [A], and [|A|A] = ∅ otherwise.
Therefore [|A|A] = WAi .
(7) Subsumption. Let w be in WXi ∩WYi ∩WAi , and suppose that (a)
w ∈ [X < Y ] and (b) w ∈ [XA]. We have then: (a) Xi < Y i and
consequently WYi ⊂ WXi , and (b) WXi ⊂ [A]. So, WYi ⊂ [A], and then
WYi = [XA]. Now since w ∈ WXi ,w ∈ [XA].
(8) Rigidity. Let w be in WXi ∩WYi . Suppose w ∈ [X ≈ Y ]. We then
have: [X ≈ Y ] 6= ∅, and thus [X ≈ Y ] = W(X+Y)i . But this implies
that [X+YX ≈ Y ] = W(X+Y)i . Since W(X+Y)i = WXi ∩ WYi , we have:
w ∈ [X+YX ≈ Y ].
(9) Chaining. Let w be in WXi ∩WAi . Suppose w ∈ [cXA]. We then
have: [cXA] 6= ∅, and thus W(cX)i ⊂ [A]. But since W(cX)i = WXi , we
have WXi ⊂ [A], and consequently [XA] = WXi . Thus w ∈ [XA].
(10) Localization. Letw be inWXi∩WAi . Supposew ∈ [XA]. We then
have: [XA] 6= ∅, and thus WXi ⊂ [A]. But since [A] ⊂ WAi , we have
WXi ⊂ WAi . Hence, Ai < γ (Xi) = (cX)i . Thus 〈S, 1,t, γ, i〉 satisfies
|A| < cX, and then [|A| < cX] = WXi ∩WAi . Consequently w ∈ [|A| <
cX].
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V. COMPLETENESS
Let α be a non-theorem of E5pi , i.e. be such that 0 α, and let @ be an L-
maximal E5pi -consistent extension of {∼α} (we may use a Lindenbaum-
type construction to prove the existence of @).
PROPOSITION V.1. Every theorem of E5pi is contained in @, and if
A ∈ @ and A ⊃ B ∈ @ then B ∈ @.
Proof. Standard.
PROPOSITION V.2. There exists a constituency model which satisfies
every d-formula of @ and only them.
Proof. LetD be the set of all delimiters of L. For every delimiter X, let
ρ(X) be {Y : Y ∈ D and X ≈ Y ∈ @}. And finally, let 1 be ρ(V ), and let
S be {ρ(X) : X ∈ D}.
From Proposition V.1 and the logic of delimiters, one can prove that:
(i) for every X and Y in D, ρ(X) = ρ(Y ) iff X ≈ Y ∈ @.
(ii) for every X and Y in D, ρ(X) < ρ(Y ) iff X < Y ∈ @.
Let us define two operations t and γ on S by:
x t y = ρ(X + Y ) for some delimiters X and Y such that ρ(X) = x
and ρ(Y ) = y, and
γ (x) = ρ(cX) for some delimiter X such that ρ(X) = x.
From (i) above and the logic of delimiters, it follows that for everyX,X′, Y
and Y ′ in D, if ρ(X) = ρ(X′) and ρ(Y ) = ρ(Y ′), then ρ(X + Y ) =
ρ(X′ + Y ′), and ρ(cX) = ρ(cX′). As a consequence, our two operations
do not depend on the particular delimiters chosen. It is easy to check that
1 = 〈S, 1,t, γ 〉 is a dependence structure (use (i), (ii) and the logic of
delimiters).
Now, let i be the function defined by the following two conditions:
If X is a basic delimiter, i(X) = ρ(X), and
if A is a sentence letter, i(A) = ρ(|A|).
Since i(V ) = ρ(V ) = 1, i is a constituency function for L on 1. One can
then verify that for every delimiter X,Xi = ρ(X). From (i) above, it then
follows that for every d-atom, A, 〈1, i〉 satisfies A iff A ∈ @. By an easy
induction, one can then prove that for every d-formula A, 〈1, i〉 satisfies
A iff A ∈@.
If X is a delimiter, let @[X] be the set of all formulas A such that
XA ∈@.
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PROPOSITION V.3. For all delimiters X and Y :
(i) if Xi < Y i then @[X] ⊂@[Y ]
(ii) if Xi = Y i then @[X] =@[Y ]
(iii) @[X] ∪@[Y ] ⊂@[X + Y ]
(iv) @[cX] =@[X]
Proof. (i) (a) Assume Xi < Y i . Then by Proposition V.2(ii), X < Y ∈
@. Thus by Subsumption and Proposition V.1, for every formula A, if
XA ∈ @ then YA ∈ @. That is: for every formula A, if A ∈ @[X]
then A ∈@[Y ].
(ii) From (i) and the fact that in any semilattice 〈S,t〉, x = y iff (x < y
and y < x).
(iii)Xi < (X+Y )i. Thus by (i), @[X] ⊂@[X+Y ]. Similarly, @[Y ] ⊂
@[X + Y ]. Hence @[X] ∪@[Y ] ⊂@[X + Y ].
(iv) Xi < (cX)i . Thus by (i) @[X] ⊂ @[cX]. Now suppose cXA ∈
@. By Chaining and Proposition V.1, XA ∈@. So, @[cX] ⊂@[X].
PROPOSITION V.4. For every delimiter X, @[X] is consistent and for
every A in @[X], Ai < γ (Xi).
Proof. (1) IfA ∈ @[X], thenXA ∈ @, and soA ∈@ by the T -axiom
and Proposition V.1. Thus, @[X] is a part of @, and is thereby consistent.
(2) If A ∈ @[X], then XA ∈ @, and so |A| < cX ∈ @ by Lo-
calization and Proposition V.1. By Proposition V.2(ii), |A|i < cXi . So,
Ai < γ (Xi).
Let us call a set 6 of sentences X-maximal provided that (i) for every
formula A ∈ 6, Ai < γ (Xi), and (ii) for every formula A such that Ai <
γ (Xi), either A ∈ 6 or ∼A ∈ 6. Clearly, every consistent set of formulas
satisfying (i) (in particular every @[X]) has some X-maximal consistent
extension (adapt the usual Lindenbaum-type construction). Let us call [X]
the set of all X-maximal consistent extensions of @[X]. We have:
PROPOSITION V.5. For all delimiters X and Y , the three following con-
ditions are equivalent:
(i) [X] = [Y ]
(ii) [X] ∩ [Y ] 6= ∅
(iii) γ (Xi) = γ (Y i).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) For every delimiter X,XX ≈ X ∈ @ by Propo-
sition II.1(vi), the logic of delimiters and Proposition V.1. Thus @[X] is
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never empty. Consequently, for every delimiter X, [X] 6= ∅. It follows that
for all delimiters X and Y , if [X] = [Y ] then [X] ∩ [Y ] 6= ∅.
(ii) ⇒ (iii) Suppose that [X] ∩ [Y ] 6= ∅, and let w be in [X] ∩ [Y ].
Since X ≈ X ∈ @[X], then X ≈ X ∈ w. But since w ∈ [Y ], we
have Xi = (X ≈ X)i < γ (Y i). By a similar argument, Y i < γ (Xi).
Consequently, γ (Xi) = γ (Y i).
(iii)⇒ (i) Suppose that γ (Xi) = γ (Y i), that is: (cX)i = (cY )i . Then
by Proposition V.2(i), cX ≈ cY ∈ @. By Subsumption, Chaining and
Proposition V.1, it follows that for every formula A,XA ∈ @ iff YA ∈
@. That is: @[X] =@[Y ]. So, [X] = [Y ].
LetW be
⋃{[X] :X a delimiter}, and let dom be the function fromW onto
γ (S) such that for every w in W , dom(w) = γ (Xi) for some delimiter X
such that w ∈ [X] (by Proposition V.5, this condition determines only
one function). Note that (i) dom(@) = γ (V i) = γ (1) = 1, and that (ii)
for every w in W , dom(w) is closed. Also notice that dom is surjective.
In effect, let x be in γ (S) with, say, x = γ (Xi), and let w be in [X].
Suppose that dom(w) = γ (Y i). We then have w ∈ [Y ]. So, [X] ∩ [Y ] 6=
∅, and then by Proposition V.5, γ (Xi) = γ (Y i). Thus, x = dom(w).
Finally let us put ‖A‖ =df {w ∈ W :A ∈ w} for every formula A. By the
definition of the worlds, for every formula A, ‖A‖ ⊂ WAi . All this entails
that 〈W,@,1, dom, i, [·]〉, where [·] is the truth-set function satisfying
[A] = ‖A‖ for every sentence letter A, is an E5pi -model. Our aim is now
to prove that for every formula A, [A] = ‖A‖.
PROPOSITION V.6. Every theorem A of E5pi is contained in every Ai-
world, and for every world, w, if A ∈ w and A ⊃ B ∈ w then B ∈ w.
Proof. (1) By maximality, for every formula A and every Ai-world w,
either A ∈ w or ∼A ∈ w. It follows by consistency that for every theorem
A and every Ai-world w, A ∈ w.
(2) Let w ∈ W be such that S ∈ w and A ⊃ B ∈ w. Since A ⊃ B ∈ w,
then w is an (A ⊃ B)i-world. But (A ⊃ B)i = Ai t Bi . Thus w is a
Bi-world. Therefore, either B ∈ w or ∼B ∈ w by maximality. Now by
truth-functional logic, it is a theorem of E5pi that ∼(A&A ⊃ B&∼B).
Therefore since w is consistent, ∼B /∈ w. So, B ∈ w.
PROPOSITION V.7. For every formula A and delimiter X, if A ∈ @[X]
then WXi ⊂ ‖A‖.
Proof. Let A be a formula, X a delimiter and w a world with, say,
dom(w) = γ (Y i). Suppose that w ∈ WXi . This means that Xi < γ (Y i) =
(cY )i. Thus by Propositions V.3 (i) and (iv), @[X] ⊂ @[Y ]. Since w ∈
[Y ],@[Y ] ⊂ w. So, @[X] ⊂ w.
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PROPOSITION V.8. Let A be a d-atom. The three following conditions
are equivalent:
(i) ‖A‖ 6= ∅
(ii) ‖A‖ = WAi
(iii) @ ∈ ‖A‖
Proof. (i)⇒ (iii) Suppose that @ /∈ ‖A‖ – i.e. A /∈ @. By maximality,
∼A ∈ @. By Proposition II.1(vi), `∼A ⊃ |A|∼A. So by Proposition V.1,
|A|∼A ∈ @, i.e. ∼A ∈ @[|A|]. Now suppose that ‖A‖ 6= ∅ – i.e. that
for some w in W , A ∈ w with, say, dom(w) = γ (Y i). We then have
Ai < γ (Y i), and thus @[|A|] ⊂@[Y ] by Propositions V.3(i) and (iv). We
consequently have ∼A ∈@[Y ], and thus (since @[Y ] ⊂ w)∼A ∈ w. But
this is impossible since w is consistent. So, if @ /∈ ‖A‖ then ‖A‖ = ∅.
(iii)⇒ (i) Trivial.
(ii)⇒ (iii) Since @ ∈ WXi for every delimiter X.
(iii) ⇒ (ii) As we have seen, for every formula A, ‖A‖ ⊂ WAi . So,
we have to prove that for every d-atom A, if @ ∈ ‖A‖, then WAi ⊂
‖A‖. Let A be a d-atom and suppose A ∈ @. By Proposition II.1(vi),
`A ⊃ |A|A. Hence by Proposition V.1, |A|A ∈ @, i.e. A ∈ @[|A|]. By
Proposition V.7, we have the result.
PROPOSITION V.9. Let A be a formula and X a delimiter. Then WXi ⊂
‖A‖ iff XA ∈@.
Proof. (i) Suppose XA ∈ @, i.e. A ∈ @[X]. By Proposition V.7,
WXi ⊂ ‖A‖.
(ii) Either Ai < γ (Xi) is the case or it is not.
(a) Suppose it is not the case. Let w be a world such that γ (Xi) =
dom(w) (such a world exists since dom is surjective). Thus, w ∈ WXi .
Since Ai is not part of dom(w), then a fortiori A /∈ w, i.e. w /∈ ‖A‖. So, it
is not the case that WXi ⊂ ‖A‖.
(b) Now suppose Ai < γ (Xi) and XA /∈ @. I shall first prove that
@[X] ∪ {∼A} is consistent. Suppose it is not. Then there are B1, . . . , Bn
in @[X] such that `(B1& · · ·&Bn) ⊃ A. By Necessitation (and the logic
of delimiters), then, `|B1|+···+|Bn|+|A|[(B1& · · ·&Bn) ⊃ A], and hence
by Proposition V.1 (|B1|+···+|Bn|+|A|[(B1& · · ·&Bn) ⊃ A]) ∈ @. Since
Ai < γ (Xi) = (cX)i , we have |A| < cX ∈ @ by Proposition V.2(ii).
For the same reasons, we have also |Bk| < cX ∈ @ for all k between
1 and n. So by the logic of delimiters, Subsumption and Proposition V.1,
(cX[(B1& · · ·&Bn) ⊃ A]) ∈@. Finally by Chaining and Proposition V.1,
(X[(B1& · · ·&Bn) ⊃ A]) ∈ @. By the K-axiom and Proposition V.1,
then, ifX(B1& · · ·&Bn) ∈@ thenXA ∈ @. But now, sinceB1, . . . , Bn
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are in @[X],XB1, . . . ,XBn are in @, and thus by Proposition II.1(iv)
and Proposition V.1, X(B1& · · ·&Bn) ∈ @. So XA ∈ @. Contradic-
tion. Hence, @[X]∪{∼A} is consistent. Letw be anX-maximal consistent
extension of @[X] ∪ {∼A}. w is in WXi since w is an X-maximal consis-
tent extension of @[X]. Now, we have ∼A ∈ w, and thus by consistency
A /∈ w. Therefore, it is not the case that WXi ⊂ ‖A‖.
PROPOSITION V.10. Let A be a formula and X a delimiter. The three
following conditions are equivalent:
(i) ‖XA‖ 6= ∅
(ii) ‖XA‖ = WXi
(iii) @ ∈ ‖XA‖.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (iii) Suppose that ‖XA‖ 6= ∅, i.e. that for some world
w, XA ∈ w. By Localization and Proposition V.6, |A| < cX ∈ w. By
Proposition V.8, |A| < cX ∈ @. But since `|A| < cX ⊃ X + |A| < cX,
we have X + |A| < cX ∈ @ by Proposition V.1. Now suppose @ /∈
‖XA‖, i.e. XA /∈ @. By consistency, ∼XA ∈ @. By the E-axiom
and Proposition V.1, X+|A|∼XA ∈ @. Since X + |A| < cX ∈ @,
we have cX∼XA ∈ @ by Subsumption and Proposition V.1, and thus
by Chaining and Proposition V.1, X∼XA ∈ @, i.e. ∼XA ∈ @[X].
So, WXi ⊂ ‖∼XA‖ by Proposition V.7. Now, since XA ∈ w, we have
(XA)i < dom(w), and so Xi < dom(w), i.e. w ∈ WXi . Therefore,
w ∈ ‖∼XA‖, that is: ∼XA ∈ w. Contradiction. So, if ‖XA‖ 6= ∅,
then @ ∈ ‖XA‖.
(iii)⇒ (i) Trivial.
(ii)⇒ (iii) Follows from the fact that @ ∈ WXi for every delimiter X.
(iii) ⇒ (ii) In any case, ‖XA‖ ⊂ WXi . For (a) in any case if w ∈
‖XA‖ then w is a (XA)i-world and (b) every (XA)i-world is an Xi-
world. Suppose now that @ ∈ ‖XA‖, i.e. that XA ∈ @. By Propo-
sition II.1(v) and Proposition V.1, XXA ∈ @, i.e. XA ∈ @[X]. By
Proposition V.7, we get: WXi ⊂ ‖XA‖.
PROPOSITION V.11. For all delimiters X and Y and for all formulas A
and B:
(1) ‖X ≈ Y‖ = (i) WAi if Xi = Y i
(ii) ∅ otherwise
(2) ‖∼A‖ = WAi − ‖A‖
(3) ‖A&B‖ = ‖A‖ ∩ ‖B‖
(4) ‖XA‖ = (i) WXi if WXi ⊂ ‖A‖
(ii) ∅ otherwise
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Proof. (1) Let X and Y be delimiters. By Proposition V.2(i), Xi = Y i
iff X ≈ Y ∈ @, i.e. iff @ ∈ ‖X ≈ Y‖. The result then follows from
Proposition V.8.
(2) and (3) One can easily verify (using maximality and consistency)
that (i) ∼A ∈ w iff w ∈ WAi and A /∈ w, and that (ii) A&B ∈ w iff A ∈ w
and B ∈ w.
(4) By Proposition V.9 and V.10.
PROPOSITION V.12. For every formula A, [A] = ‖A‖.
Proof. From Proposition V.11.
PROPOSITION V.13. E5pi is complete (with respect to the class of E5pi -
models).
Proof. Since ∼α ∈ @ and @ is maximal, α /∈ @. (Recall that α is
the non-theorem introduced at the beginning of the present section). But
since for every delimiter X, @ ∈ WXi , we have ‖α‖ 6= Wαi . Hence by
Proposition V.12 [α] 6= Wαi . I.e. α is not valid in 〈W,@,1, dom, i, [·]〉,
and thus is not valid tout court.
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NOTES
1 At the time I worked on the present paper only the first of Fine’s papers was available
to me. I became acquainted with ‘Semantics for the Logic of Essence’ after obtaining the
results presented here.
2 Fine aims at developing such a system in response to his own objections to the standard
modal contruals of essence. See his ‘Essence and Modality’.
3 The problem of interpreting≈ as class identity was suggested to me by an anonymous
referee of the JPL.
4 According to Fine, x ontologically depends on y iff (roughly) y is a constituent of
some proposition which is true in virtue of the nature of x. See his ‘Ontological De-
pendence’ for a detailed discussion, in particular for the distinction between ontological
dependence and existential dependence. It is not within the scope of the present paper to
say very much about these notions.
5 I use . . .i or (. . .)i for i(. . .), and in order to simplify notation, I omit the object
language brackets.
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